Today's Article
Douglas Feith, the
man whose lies got
American troops
into Iraq, is now lying
about his role in
putting them there.
man whose lies got
American troops
into Iraq, is now lying
about his role in
putting them there.
The American Spark
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Main Architect of Pre-Iraq War Intelligence Denies Responsibility
By Cliff Montgomery - May 1st, 2007
Douglas Feith, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon whom many say is the main
architect of the false intelligence which got America into Iraq, recently made a round of the Sunday talk shows
sprouting the pretense that his prewar assessment of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was simply a
much-needed critique of the CIA's intelligence on the subject.
"It's healthy to criticize the CIA's intelligence," said Feith during a February appearance on Fox News Sunday.
"What the people in the Pentagon were doing was right. It was good government."
It was nothing of the kind. Feith has only added insult to injury for every honest American. A February review by
the Defense Department Inspector General (DoD IG) clearly stated that Feith's office did not provide a mere
intelligence critique, but instead "developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence
assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent
with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers."
"This condition," the report continued, "occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and
dissemination."
The IG's report also found that "the CIA and DIA disavowed any 'mature, symbiotic' relationship between Iraq
and al-Qaida."
"No one in my office ever claimed there was an operational relationship," Feith denied on Fox News Sunday.
"[But] there was a relationship," he added.
In truth, the 2004 report from the bi-partisan Sept. 11th Commission found no evidence of a collaborative
relationship between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization--the same conclusion
reached by every official Post-Iraq War study on the subject.
The DoD IG report reiterated the Pentagon's view that the actions of Feith's office were neither illegal or
unauthorized--but the IG admitted they were an inappropriate "alternative" analysis which did not reflect the
consensus of the intelligence community or include caveats about the information's reliability.
Feith claimed this amounted to circular logic from the Pentagon's internal watchdog.
"The people in my office were doing a criticism of the intelligence community consensus," Feith said. "By
definition, that criticism varied. If it didn't vary, they wouldn't have done the criticism."
Feith's rhetorical device here is a type of denial known as the "half-truth"--he deliberately leaves out the part of
the truth which makes him look bad. Feith's argument hinges on the falsehood that his actions and those of
his staff to aggressively argue for an Iraq invasion is the same as offering an unbiased critique of varying
intelligence.
But let's put this half-truth in context: Imagine you are a doctor, and a patient of yours is very sick. This patient
has been to a few previous doctors, who offered rather differing views on the patient's illness. If you're a
concerned and honest doctor, you would indeed point out the variation of views, but would also try to refrain
from any aggressive treatment until more definite evidence shows a certain prognosis to be the correct one.
However, a dishonest doctor would openly ignore all the facts he or she does not wish to hear, and would
aggressively put forward only that evidence--however flimsy or foolish--which fits their unfounded
preconceptions.
Let's just say that while the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Feith behaved like a dishonest doctor
rather than an honest one and leave it at that.
When asked if his office ever made the case against going to war with Saddam Hussein, Feith said, "The
answer is emphatically yes."
But wishful thinking is not truth Mr. Feith, regardless of the intensity of the wish.
Senator Jack Reed (R-RI), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pointed out that the
Pentagon--through Feith's office--in fact intentionally made an exclusive case for war in 2002 based on
obviously skewed analysis.
"They did it very deliberately," Sen. Reed replied. "They used that analysis. It was leaked to the media. It was
reported in newspapers. It took on a credibility beyond the facts that the intelligence community had." Reed
also appeared on Fox News Sunday.
In February, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the declassified
report of the DoD IG on its "Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy." The report was declassified at Levin's request.
"It is important for the public to see why the Pentagon's Inspector General concluded that Secretary Feith's
office 'developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and
al-Qaeda relationship,'" said Sen. Levin.
"These included 'conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community,' and
why the Inspector General concluded that these actions were 'inappropriate,'" he added.
By Cliff Montgomery - May 1st, 2007
Douglas Feith, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon whom many say is the main
architect of the false intelligence which got America into Iraq, recently made a round of the Sunday talk shows
sprouting the pretense that his prewar assessment of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was simply a
much-needed critique of the CIA's intelligence on the subject.
"It's healthy to criticize the CIA's intelligence," said Feith during a February appearance on Fox News Sunday.
"What the people in the Pentagon were doing was right. It was good government."
It was nothing of the kind. Feith has only added insult to injury for every honest American. A February review by
the Defense Department Inspector General (DoD IG) clearly stated that Feith's office did not provide a mere
intelligence critique, but instead "developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence
assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent
with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers."
"This condition," the report continued, "occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and
dissemination."
The IG's report also found that "the CIA and DIA disavowed any 'mature, symbiotic' relationship between Iraq
and al-Qaida."
"No one in my office ever claimed there was an operational relationship," Feith denied on Fox News Sunday.
"[But] there was a relationship," he added.
In truth, the 2004 report from the bi-partisan Sept. 11th Commission found no evidence of a collaborative
relationship between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization--the same conclusion
reached by every official Post-Iraq War study on the subject.
The DoD IG report reiterated the Pentagon's view that the actions of Feith's office were neither illegal or
unauthorized--but the IG admitted they were an inappropriate "alternative" analysis which did not reflect the
consensus of the intelligence community or include caveats about the information's reliability.
Feith claimed this amounted to circular logic from the Pentagon's internal watchdog.
"The people in my office were doing a criticism of the intelligence community consensus," Feith said. "By
definition, that criticism varied. If it didn't vary, they wouldn't have done the criticism."
Feith's rhetorical device here is a type of denial known as the "half-truth"--he deliberately leaves out the part of
the truth which makes him look bad. Feith's argument hinges on the falsehood that his actions and those of
his staff to aggressively argue for an Iraq invasion is the same as offering an unbiased critique of varying
intelligence.
But let's put this half-truth in context: Imagine you are a doctor, and a patient of yours is very sick. This patient
has been to a few previous doctors, who offered rather differing views on the patient's illness. If you're a
concerned and honest doctor, you would indeed point out the variation of views, but would also try to refrain
from any aggressive treatment until more definite evidence shows a certain prognosis to be the correct one.
However, a dishonest doctor would openly ignore all the facts he or she does not wish to hear, and would
aggressively put forward only that evidence--however flimsy or foolish--which fits their unfounded
preconceptions.
Let's just say that while the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Feith behaved like a dishonest doctor
rather than an honest one and leave it at that.
When asked if his office ever made the case against going to war with Saddam Hussein, Feith said, "The
answer is emphatically yes."
But wishful thinking is not truth Mr. Feith, regardless of the intensity of the wish.
Senator Jack Reed (R-RI), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pointed out that the
Pentagon--through Feith's office--in fact intentionally made an exclusive case for war in 2002 based on
obviously skewed analysis.
"They did it very deliberately," Sen. Reed replied. "They used that analysis. It was leaked to the media. It was
reported in newspapers. It took on a credibility beyond the facts that the intelligence community had." Reed
also appeared on Fox News Sunday.
In February, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the declassified
report of the DoD IG on its "Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy." The report was declassified at Levin's request.
"It is important for the public to see why the Pentagon's Inspector General concluded that Secretary Feith's
office 'developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and
al-Qaeda relationship,'" said Sen. Levin.
"These included 'conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community,' and
why the Inspector General concluded that these actions were 'inappropriate,'" he added.