Today's Article
British think tank
Chatham House
declares that 'Iraq is
on the verge of
being a failed state.'
Chatham House
declares that 'Iraq is
on the verge of
being a failed state.'
The American Spark
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Iraq On The Verge Of Collapse, Says Leading Think Tank
By Cliff Montgomery - May 17th, 2007
Chatham House, a top British think-tank, "is one of the world's leading organizations for the analysis of
international issues." On Thursday it released a report entitled, "Accepting Realities In Iraq", which recognized
that the imploding country is on the verge of irreparable "collapse and fragmentation".
We quote from the report below:
"A critical time has now arrived for the future of Iraq.
"The situation continues to deteriorate markedly, not just in terms of the numbers of bombs exploding and
corpses being found on the streets, but in terms of the nature of the violence – including the brutality of Iraqi-
on-Iraqi violence. This internecine fighting is perhaps the greatest threat to the preservation of some social
cohesion upon which a future can be built.
"Some analysts contend that the level of violence in Iraq has in fact declined, particularly since the onset of the
US-led military surge designed to improve the security situation in Baghdad. However, if numbers of bomb
attacks can be used as an indicator, then it can reasonably be assumed that the security situation remains as
perilous as before the surge. The number of multiple fatality bombings in Iraq remained constant in March and
April 2007 and, according to the Iraqi authorities, 1,500 civilians were killed in April alone...
"Furthermore, it should be noted that the major Shi’a militias, including the Jaish al-Mahdi, have adopted a low
profile during the surge but are very likely to re-emerge as a military force.
"The surge also may have been responsible for two other dynamics – the evacuation of significant numbers of
Jaish al-Mahdi members from Sadr City, making it more insecure and allowing Sunni Arab insurgents to
increase their attacks, and the refocusing of insurgent activity away from Baghdad to other urban centres,
including Kirkuk and Mosul.
"It is time for a full appraisal of the realities in Iraq. On current evidence these realities are very disturbing and it
can no longer be assumed that Iraq will ultimately survive as a united entity. The four years since the removal of
Saddam’s regime have been deeply unsuccessful for the Multinational Force in Iraq and the new Iraqi
government. Iraq’s attempted transition from dictatorship to democracy has been harrowing and multi-faceted
violence appears likely to continue and intensify.
"It can be argued that Iraq is on the verge of being a failed state which faces the distinct possibility of collapse
and fragmentation.
"The governments of the US and the UK, and the wider international community, continue to struggle with their
analysis of Iraq, in particular of the country’s political and social structures. This analytical failing has led to the
pursuit of strategies that suit ideal depictions of how Iraq should look, but are often unrepresentative of the
current situation.
"Different strategies are required which build upon an understanding of the following realities:
• The social fabric of Iraq has been torn apart.
• There is not ‘one’ civil war, nor ‘one’ insurgency, but several civil wars and insurgencies between different
communities and organizations; there is also a range of actors seeking to undermine, overthrow or take control
of the Iraqi government.
• Iraqi nationalisms exist, but one distinct ‘Iraqi’ nationalism does not. Iraq has fractured into regions
dominated by sectarian, ethnic or tribal political groupings that have gained further strength from their control
of informal local economies.
• Al-Qaeda [now] has a very real presence in Iraq that has spread to the major cities of the centre and north of
the country, including Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul. Although Al-Qaeda’s position is challenged by local actors, it
is a mistake to exaggerate the ability of tribal groups and other insurgents to stop the momentum building
behind [Al-Qaeda's] operations in Iraq.
• Regional powers have a greater capacity than either the US or the UK to influence events in Iraq. This arises
from a historical legacy of social interaction and religious association that exists irrespective of modern
international state boundaries.
• The Iraqi government is not able to exert authority evenly or effectively over the country. Across huge
swathes of territory, it is largely irrelevant in terms of ordering social, economic, and political life. At best, it is
merely one of several ‘state-like actors’ that now exist in Iraq.
• Security in Iraq cannot be ‘normalized’ in a matter of months but instead should be considered within a
timeframe of many years. If the Multinational Force is withdrawn, Iraq’s nascent security services would not be
able to cope with the current levels of insecurity.
"The choices available to the US and to the Iraqi government are now [however] severely limited and,
particularly for the US, distinctly unpalatable as they would require an acceptance of Anthony Cordesman’s
suggestion that ‘it is more than possible that a failed President and a failed administration will preside over a
failed war for the second time since Vietnam’."
By Cliff Montgomery - May 17th, 2007
Chatham House, a top British think-tank, "is one of the world's leading organizations for the analysis of
international issues." On Thursday it released a report entitled, "Accepting Realities In Iraq", which recognized
that the imploding country is on the verge of irreparable "collapse and fragmentation".
We quote from the report below:
"A critical time has now arrived for the future of Iraq.
"The situation continues to deteriorate markedly, not just in terms of the numbers of bombs exploding and
corpses being found on the streets, but in terms of the nature of the violence – including the brutality of Iraqi-
on-Iraqi violence. This internecine fighting is perhaps the greatest threat to the preservation of some social
cohesion upon which a future can be built.
"Some analysts contend that the level of violence in Iraq has in fact declined, particularly since the onset of the
US-led military surge designed to improve the security situation in Baghdad. However, if numbers of bomb
attacks can be used as an indicator, then it can reasonably be assumed that the security situation remains as
perilous as before the surge. The number of multiple fatality bombings in Iraq remained constant in March and
April 2007 and, according to the Iraqi authorities, 1,500 civilians were killed in April alone...
"Furthermore, it should be noted that the major Shi’a militias, including the Jaish al-Mahdi, have adopted a low
profile during the surge but are very likely to re-emerge as a military force.
"The surge also may have been responsible for two other dynamics – the evacuation of significant numbers of
Jaish al-Mahdi members from Sadr City, making it more insecure and allowing Sunni Arab insurgents to
increase their attacks, and the refocusing of insurgent activity away from Baghdad to other urban centres,
including Kirkuk and Mosul.
"It is time for a full appraisal of the realities in Iraq. On current evidence these realities are very disturbing and it
can no longer be assumed that Iraq will ultimately survive as a united entity. The four years since the removal of
Saddam’s regime have been deeply unsuccessful for the Multinational Force in Iraq and the new Iraqi
government. Iraq’s attempted transition from dictatorship to democracy has been harrowing and multi-faceted
violence appears likely to continue and intensify.
"It can be argued that Iraq is on the verge of being a failed state which faces the distinct possibility of collapse
and fragmentation.
"The governments of the US and the UK, and the wider international community, continue to struggle with their
analysis of Iraq, in particular of the country’s political and social structures. This analytical failing has led to the
pursuit of strategies that suit ideal depictions of how Iraq should look, but are often unrepresentative of the
current situation.
"Different strategies are required which build upon an understanding of the following realities:
• The social fabric of Iraq has been torn apart.
• There is not ‘one’ civil war, nor ‘one’ insurgency, but several civil wars and insurgencies between different
communities and organizations; there is also a range of actors seeking to undermine, overthrow or take control
of the Iraqi government.
• Iraqi nationalisms exist, but one distinct ‘Iraqi’ nationalism does not. Iraq has fractured into regions
dominated by sectarian, ethnic or tribal political groupings that have gained further strength from their control
of informal local economies.
• Al-Qaeda [now] has a very real presence in Iraq that has spread to the major cities of the centre and north of
the country, including Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul. Although Al-Qaeda’s position is challenged by local actors, it
is a mistake to exaggerate the ability of tribal groups and other insurgents to stop the momentum building
behind [Al-Qaeda's] operations in Iraq.
• Regional powers have a greater capacity than either the US or the UK to influence events in Iraq. This arises
from a historical legacy of social interaction and religious association that exists irrespective of modern
international state boundaries.
• The Iraqi government is not able to exert authority evenly or effectively over the country. Across huge
swathes of territory, it is largely irrelevant in terms of ordering social, economic, and political life. At best, it is
merely one of several ‘state-like actors’ that now exist in Iraq.
• Security in Iraq cannot be ‘normalized’ in a matter of months but instead should be considered within a
timeframe of many years. If the Multinational Force is withdrawn, Iraq’s nascent security services would not be
able to cope with the current levels of insecurity.
"The choices available to the US and to the Iraqi government are now [however] severely limited and,
particularly for the US, distinctly unpalatable as they would require an acceptance of Anthony Cordesman’s
suggestion that ‘it is more than possible that a failed President and a failed administration will preside over a
failed war for the second time since Vietnam’."