Today's Article
The department finally
seems to understand
that the democratic
movements of a
nation must come
from the people
themselves.
The American Spark
Has State Dept. Learned Mistakes Of Iraq?
By Cliff Montgomery - Feb. 11th, 2008
Today The American Spark is publishing the entire executive summary of a State Department report
published in October 2007. Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work In
Progress, seems to reveal an intellectual sea change in at least some levels of the Bush Administration.
The tone and relative thoughtfulness of this study--particularly the segments discussing the need for any
nation's democratic movements to come from the people themselves if they are to have any hope of
success--is noteworthy.
We quote the summary below:
"The relative stability of the bipolar Cold War era has given way to a more volatile international environment in
which adversaries employ unconventional, and often violent, tactics including terrorism, insurgency,
propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and criminal money-making activities.
"This Interim Guide focuses specifically on insurgency and the strategies and tactics to combat it, collectively
known as counterinsurgency (COIN).
"Information, including intelligence; economic development, incentives, and sanctions; security and public
services; and social and political resolution are all necessary components of COIN, and none is sufficient in
isolation from the others; moreover, each of these four spheres depends on the others.
"This document is intended to provide a broad understanding of the characteristics of COIN, and to serve as a
basis for interagency discussion of policy, programs, and the development of national capabilities relevant to
COIN.
"Insurgency is a protracted political-military campaign conducted by an organized movement seeking to
subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a
country through the use of force and alternative political organizations.
"Insurgents exploit societal trends, grievances, and needs; insurgency is 'armed politics,' and while military
action may be an important component of COIN, political resolution is indispensable to success.
"Conflict dynamics that contribute to insurgencies include societal incentives for violence; state incapacity to
contain or effectively respond to violence; and regional or broader international conditions that inspire, or fail to
discourage, violence.
"Effective COIN requires deep and detailed context- and culture-specific understanding of local and regional
conditions, and ultimately must enable the affected government to gain the support of its population, rendering
ineffective the insurgents and their tactics.
"In the U.S. Government, when the President directs a national response to a current or emerging conflict, the
Secretary of State manages the formal interagency assessment and planning process that will govern the
USG response.
"Where insurgency, nascent or active, does not rise to the level of Presidential determination, interagency
efforts, starting with the U.S. mission to the affected nation, may be able, in concerted action with the host
nation and other partners, to help prevent or curtail the development of a serious challenge by insurgent actors
to the affected government.
"An integrated - and ideally, a whole-of-government - planning effort based on a common assessment of the
environment and understanding of the problem is the most effective approach to buttressing or helping to build
effective government institutions in COIN.
"Planning will integrate civilian and military capabilities, and synchronize and sequence the activities of
contributors, to help the threatened government achieve control through indigenous government institutions.
"An effective information campaign is indispensable to the validation and reinforcement of COIN activities.
"The public face and main effort of every COIN operation must be indigenous; only the national government
can address in a sustainable way the root causes an insurgency, establish its legitimacy with its populations,
and remove or reintegrate the insurgents.
"Developing indigenous capabilities to accomplish these tasks is central to COIN, and international support is
essential to the success of the effort; in fact, supporting the development of these capabilities must be the
main effort of COIN.
"Enlisting and enabling the support and assistance of regional and other interested partners should be a key
component of any COIN plan. [Italics added.]
"U.S government organizations with roles or capabilities essential to COIN include the Intelligence Community;
the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Transportation,
Commerce, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
"Other agencies, such as the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, may have relevant
capabilities.
"The National Security Council may play a leading, coordinating, or enabling role in COIN strategy development
and execution.
"The Chief of Mission, supported by the Combatant Commander, coordinates with the affected nation the
implementation of U.S. government support to COIN. The representatives of each department and agency on
the Country Team support with their particular programs and operations the overall COIN strategy.
"The contributions of other national and international organizations, as well as non-governmental and private
sector actors, are critical to effective COIN. Every functional contribution that strengthens or promotes
accountable and effective indigenous governance responsive to the needs of its people is important; COIN is
the sum of these efforts."
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