Today's Article
How may we be
sure that materials
from Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal
won't fall into the
wrong hands?
sure that materials
from Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal
won't fall into the
wrong hands?
The American Spark
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Who's In Control Of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal?
By Cliff Montgomery - Mar. 18th, 2008
The American Spark poses a simple question about Pakistan's current leader: If President Pervez Musharraf
cannot--or will not--hunt down al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, how may we be sure that materials from his
country's nuclear arsenal won't fall into their hands?
That was the essential question investigated by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a telling report
released on January 14th, 2008.
Below we offer numerous quotes from the study:
"Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material
production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan
reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and
these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. [...]
"Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export
controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan’s
top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network.
"Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of
important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international
nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years.
"For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is 'implementing a National Security Action Plan
with the [IAEA’s] assistance.' That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S. — and Russian-led Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
"[But] current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some
observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical
sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls.
"While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it is
uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these safeguards. [...]
Proliferation Threat
"Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise
related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement
networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently
used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.
"Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet, the United States 'received fragmentary information from an intelligence service'
that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had 'sent emissaries to establish contact' with the network.
"Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005
report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, al-Qaeda 'had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of
nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.'
"Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.
"The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official reports indicate that,
at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied
that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007 statement to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that 'Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the
disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.'
"However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:
least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could…resume their
black-market business.'
"Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States
has not had 'personal, consistent access' to Khan, but added that he did not 'have all the details of everything
we’ve done.'
"Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to interview Khan directly,
according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and
has been cooperative in its investigation of Iran’s nuclear program. [...]
"Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that
Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making its security clearance
procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to
control its nuclear expertise."
Like what you're reading so far? Then why not order a full year (52 issues) of the The American Spark e-
newsletter for only $15? A major article covering an story not being told in the Corporate Press will be
delivered to your email every Monday morning for a full year, for less than 30 cents an issue. Order Now!
By Cliff Montgomery - Mar. 18th, 2008
The American Spark poses a simple question about Pakistan's current leader: If President Pervez Musharraf
cannot--or will not--hunt down al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, how may we be sure that materials from his
country's nuclear arsenal won't fall into their hands?
That was the essential question investigated by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a telling report
released on January 14th, 2008.
Below we offer numerous quotes from the study:
"Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material
production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan
reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and
these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. [...]
"Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export
controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan’s
top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network.
"Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of
important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international
nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years.
"For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is 'implementing a National Security Action Plan
with the [IAEA’s] assistance.' That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S. — and Russian-led Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
"[But] current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some
observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical
sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls.
"While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it is
uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these safeguards. [...]
Proliferation Threat
"Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise
related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement
networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently
used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.
"Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet, the United States 'received fragmentary information from an intelligence service'
that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had 'sent emissaries to establish contact' with the network.
"Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005
report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, al-Qaeda 'had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of
nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.'
"Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.
"The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official reports indicate that,
at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied
that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007 statement to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that 'Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the
disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.'
"However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:
- I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations
with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no
elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.
least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could…resume their
black-market business.'
"Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States
has not had 'personal, consistent access' to Khan, but added that he did not 'have all the details of everything
we’ve done.'
"Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet been able to interview Khan directly,
according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and
has been cooperative in its investigation of Iran’s nuclear program. [...]
"Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that
Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making its security clearance
procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to
control its nuclear expertise."
Like what you're reading so far? Then why not order a full year (52 issues) of the The American Spark e-
newsletter for only $15? A major article covering an story not being told in the Corporate Press will be
delivered to your email every Monday morning for a full year, for less than 30 cents an issue. Order Now!