Today's Article
A Pentagon agency
flatly told the Bush
Administration that its
harsh interrogation
techniques were acts
of 'torture' and would
produce 'unreliable
information.'
flatly told the Bush
Administration that its
harsh interrogation
techniques were acts
of 'torture' and would
produce 'unreliable
information.'
The American Spark
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 |
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Pentagon Agency Warned Bush Administration Against 'Torture'
By Cliff Montgomery - Apr. 27th, 2009
A Pentagon agency which advised the Bush Administration against the use of harsh interrogation techniques
on terrorism suspects flatly called the employment of extreme duress "torture" and also told Bush officials that
torture will certainly produce "unreliable information," according to eye-opening military documents prepared in
July 2002.
The Senate last week released a comprehensive study on harsh interrogation tactics; the report sometimes
quoted those memorandums. The July 2002 memos described severe techniques employed against
Americans in previous conflicts, as well as the psychological trauma of such treatment.
The Pentagon's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) ran a program known as Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE), that trains military personnel to resist deliberate acts of torture. JPRA
prepared the memorandums.
The memos apparently were submitted to the Defense Department's Office of the General Counsel just as the
Bush Administration was finalizing its CIA interrogation program which sanctioned 10 forms of severe
interrogations, including simulated drowning--a form of extreme coercion which the corporate press has taken
to calling, "waterboarding."
The JPRA documents then were sent to the acting general counsel of the CIA, John Rizzo, whose office
forwarded the memos to Bush's Justice Department, according to Senate Armed Services Committee
testimony.
The JPRA memorandums and the Detainee study are dynamite by any standard. To put it all into perspective,
The American Spark below provides the entire Senate floor statement by Armed Services Committee
Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) released on April 21st. Why? Because the matter of U.S. officials approving acts of
torture is a matter affecting everyone.
We also are providing our readers with a link to the entire Senate Armed Services Committee Report on
Detainees.
Today we’re releasing the declassified report of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s investigation into the
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. The report was approved by the Committee on November 20, 2008,
and has, in the intervening period, been under review at the Department of Defense (DoD) for declassification.
In my judgment, the report represents a condemnation of both the Bush administration’s interrogation policies
and of senior administration officials who attempted to shift the blame for abuse – such as that seen at Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan – to low ranking soldiers. Claims, such as that made by former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that detainee abuses could be chalked up to the unauthorized
acts of a “few bad apples,” were simply false.
The truth is that, early on, it was senior civilian leaders who set the tone. On September 16, 2001, Vice
President Dick Cheney suggested that the United States turn to the “dark side” in our response to 9/11. Not
long after that, after White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales called parts of the Geneva Conventions “quaint,”
President Bush determined that provisions of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to certain detainees.
Other senior officials followed the President and Vice President’s lead, authorizing policies that included harsh
and abusive interrogation techniques.
The record established by the Committee’s investigation shows that senior officials sought out information on,
were aware of training in, and authorized the use of abusive interrogation techniques. Those senior officials
bear significant responsibility for creating the legal and operational framework for the abuses. As the
Committee report concluded, authorizations of aggressive interrogation techniques by senior officials resulted
in abuse and conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for
detainees in U.S. military custody.
In a May 10, 2007, letter to his troops, General David Petraeus said that “what sets us apart from our enemies
in this fight… is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate
that we treat non-combatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are warriors, we are also all
human beings.”
With last week’s release of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions, it is now widely
known that Bush administration officials distorted Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape “SERE” training –
a legitimate program used by the military to train our troops to resist abusive enemy interrogations – by
authorizing abusive techniques from SERE for use in detainee interrogations. Those decisions conveyed the
message that abusive treatment was appropriate for detainees in U.S. custody. They were also an affront to
the values articulated by General Petraeus.
In SERE training, U.S. troops are briefly exposed, in a highly controlled setting, to abusive interrogation
techniques used by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions. The techniques are based on
tactics used by Chinese Communists against American soldiers during the Korean War for the purpose of
eliciting false confessions for propaganda purposes.
Techniques used in SERE training include stripping trainees of their clothing, placing them in stress positions,
putting hoods over their heads, subjecting them to face and body slaps, depriving them of sleep, throwing
them up against a wall, confining them in a small box, treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud music
and flashing lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures. Until recently, the Navy SERE school also
used waterboarding.
The purpose of the SERE program is to provide U.S. troops who might be captured a taste of the treatment
they might face so that they might have a better chance of surviving captivity and resisting abusive and
coercive interrogations.
SERE training techniques were never intended to be used in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody.
The Committee’s report, however, reveals troubling new details of how SERE techniques came to be used in
interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.
Influence of SERE on Military Interrogations at Guantanamo Bay
The Committee’s investigation uncovered new details about the influence of SERE techniques on military
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). According to newly released testimony from a military
behavioral scientist who worked with interrogators at GTMO:
“By early October [2002] there was increasing pressure to get ‘tougher’ with detainee interrogations” at GTMO.
(p. 50).
As a result, on October 2, 2002, two weeks after attending interrogation training led by SERE instructors from the
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the DoD agency that oversees SERE training, the behavioral scientist
and a colleague drafted a memo proposing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques at GTMO. The
behavioral scientist said he was told by GTMO’s intelligence chief that the interrogation memo needed to contain
coercive techniques or it “wasn’t going to go very far.” (p. 50).
Declassified excerpts from that memo indicate that it included stress positions, food deprivation, forced
grooming, hooding, removal of clothing, exposure to cold weather or water, and scenarios designed to
convince a detainee that “he might experience a painful or fatal outcome.”
On October 11, 2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170 (Joint Task Force 170) at
GTMO requested authority to use aggressive techniques. MG Dunlavey’s request was based on the memo
produced by the behavioral scientists.
MG Dunlavey’s request eventually made its way to Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel Jim
Haynes’ desk. Notwithstanding serious legal concerns raised by the military service lawyers, Haynes
recommended that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approve 15 of the interrogation techniques
requested by GTMO.
On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Haynes’ recommendation, authorizing such techniques
as stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias (such as fear of dogs), and deprivation of light and
auditory stimuli.
The Committee’s investigation revealed that, following Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization, senior staff at
GTMO drafted a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the use of SERE techniques, including stress
positions, forcibly stripping detainees, slapping, and “walling” them. That SOP stated that:
“The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate
for use in real-world interrogations.”
Weeks later, in January 2003, trainers from the Navy SERE school traveled to GTMO and provided training to
interrogators on the use of SERE techniques on detainees. (pp. 98-104).
Impact of Secretary Rumsfeld’s Authorization on Interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan
The influence of Secretary Rumsfeld’s December 2, 2002, authorization was not limited to interrogations at
GTMO. Newly declassified excerpts from a January 11, 2003, legal review by a Special Mission Unit (SMU)
Task Force lawyer in Afghanistan state that:
“SECDEF’s (SECretary of DEFense Donald Rumsfeld) approval of these techniques provides us the most
persuasive argument for use of ‘advanced techniques’ as we capture possible [high value targets] … the fact
that SECDEF approved the use of the… techniques at GTMO, [which is] subject to the same laws, provides an
analogy and basis for use of these techniques [in accordance with] international and U.S. law.” (p.154).
The Committee’s report also includes a summary of a July 15, 2004, interview with CENTCOM’s (U.S. Central
Command) then-Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) about Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization and its impact
in Afghanistan. The Deputy SJA said:
“The methodologies approved for GTMO… would appear to me to be legal interrogation processes. [The
Secretary of Defense] had approved them. The General Counsel had approved them. .. I believe it is fair to
say the procedures approved for Guantanamo were legal for Afghanistan.” (p. 156).
The Committee’s report provides extensive details about how the aggressive techniques made their way from
Afghanistan to Iraq.
In February 2003, an SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the SMU
interrogation policy from Afghanistan that included aggressive techniques, changed the letterhead, and
adopted the policy verbatim. (p. 158)
Months later, the Interrogation Officer in Charge at Abu Ghraib obtained a copy of the SMU interrogation
policy and submitted it, virtually unchanged, through her chain of command to Combined Joint Task Force 7
(CJTF-7), led at the time by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.
On September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General Sanchez issued an interrogation policy for CJTF-7 that
authorized interrogators to use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military
working dogs to exploit detainees’ fears in their interrogations of detainees.
The Committee’s investigation uncovered documents indicating that, almost immediately after LTG Sanchez
issued his September 14, 2003, policy, CENTCOM lawyers raised concerns about its legality.
One newly declassified email from a CENTCOM lawyer to the Staff Judge Advocate at CJTF-7 – sent just three
days after the policy was issued – warned that:
“Many of the techniques [in the CJTF-7 policy] appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III and IV and should
not be used . . .” (p. 203).
Even though the Bush administration acknowledged that the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, it was not
until nearly a month later that CJTF-7 revised that policy.
Not only did SERE techniques make their way to Iraq, but SERE instructors did as well. In September 2003,
JPRA sent a team to Iraq to provide assistance to interrogation operations at an SMU Task Force. The Chief
of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Task Force testified to the Committee in February 2008
that JPRA personnel demonstrated SERE techniques to SMU personnel including so-called “walling” and
striking a detainee as they do in SERE school. (p. 175).
As we heard at our September 2008 hearing, JPRA personnel were present during abusive interrogations
during that same trip, including one where a detainee was placed on his knees in a stress position and was
repeatedly slapped by an interrogator. (p. 176). JPRA personnel even participated in an interrogation, taking
physical control of a detainee, forcibly stripping him naked, and giving orders for him to be kept in a stress
position for 12 hours.
In August 3, 2007, testimony to the Committee, one of the JPRA team members said that, with respect to
stripping the detainee:
“We [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students.”
The Committee’s investigation revealed that forced nudity continued to be used in interrogations at the SMU
Task Force for months after the JPRA visit. (pp. 181-182).
Over the course of the investigation, the Committee obtained the statements and interviews of scores of
military personnel at Abu Ghraib. These statements reveal that the interrogation techniques authorized by
Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002 for use at GTMO – including stress positions, forced nudity, and military
working dogs – were used by military intelligence personnel responsible for interrogations.
The investigation also revealed that interrogation policies authorizing aggressive techniques were approved
months after the CJTF-7 policy was revised to exclude the techniques, and even after the investigation into
detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib had already begun. For example, an interrogation policy approved in February
2004 in Iraq included techniques such as use of military working dogs and stress positions. (p. 220).
A policy approved for CJTF-7 units in Iraq in March 2004 also included aggressive techniques. While much of
the March 2004 policy remains classified, newly declassified excerpts indicate that it warned that interrogators:
“...should consider the fact that some interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise
inconsistent with international law before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a
[CAUTION].”
Among the techniques labeled as such were a technique involving power tools, stress positions, and the
presence of military working dogs. (pp. 220-221).
Warnings about Using SERE Techniques in Interrogations
Some have asked why, if it is okay for our own U.S. personnel to be subjected to physical and psychological
pressures in SERE school, what is wrong with using those SERE training techniques on detainees? The
Committee’s investigation answered that question.
On October 2, 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan Banks, the senior Army SERE psychologist warned against
using SERE training techniques during interrogations in an email to personnel at GTMO, writing that:
"[T]he use of physical pressures brings with it a large number of potential negative side effects… When
individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of discomfort, it is more common for them to resist
harder… If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain, they will eventually do whatever it takes to
stop the pain. This will increase the amount of information they tell the interrogator, but it does not mean the
information is accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of the information because the person will
say whatever he believes will stop the pain…
"Bottom line: the likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the delivery of accurate information
from a detainee is very low. The likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the level of
resistance in a detainee is very high…" (p. 53).
Likewise, the Deputy Commander of DoD’s Criminal Investigative Task Force at GTMO told the Committee in
2006 that CITF “was troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations
would be the basis for the utilization of techniques to obtain information.” (p. 69).
Other newly declassified emails reveal additional warnings. In June 2004, after many SERE techniques had
been authorized in interrogations and JPRA was considering sending its SERE trainers to interrogation
facilities in Afghanistan, another SERE psychologist warned:
“[W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE school (done to INCREASE
RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is taught at interrogator school (done to gather information).
What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct… Simply stated, SERE
school does not train you on how to interrogate, and things you ‘learn’ there by osmosis about interrogation are
probably wrong if copied by interrogators.” (p. 229).
Conclusion
If we are to retain our status as a leader in the world, we must acknowledge and confront the abuse of
detainees in our custody. The Committee’s report and investigation makes significant progress toward that
goal.
There is still the question, however, of whether high level officials who approved and authorized those policies
should be held accountable.
I have recommended to Attorney General Holder that he select a distinguished individual or individuals – either
inside or outside the Justice Department, such as retired federal judges – to look at the volumes of evidence
relating to treatment of detainees, including evidence in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report, and
to recommend what steps, if any, should be taken to establish accountability of high-level officials – including
lawyers.
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By Cliff Montgomery - Apr. 27th, 2009
A Pentagon agency which advised the Bush Administration against the use of harsh interrogation techniques
on terrorism suspects flatly called the employment of extreme duress "torture" and also told Bush officials that
torture will certainly produce "unreliable information," according to eye-opening military documents prepared in
July 2002.
The Senate last week released a comprehensive study on harsh interrogation tactics; the report sometimes
quoted those memorandums. The July 2002 memos described severe techniques employed against
Americans in previous conflicts, as well as the psychological trauma of such treatment.
The Pentagon's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) ran a program known as Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE), that trains military personnel to resist deliberate acts of torture. JPRA
prepared the memorandums.
The memos apparently were submitted to the Defense Department's Office of the General Counsel just as the
Bush Administration was finalizing its CIA interrogation program which sanctioned 10 forms of severe
interrogations, including simulated drowning--a form of extreme coercion which the corporate press has taken
to calling, "waterboarding."
The JPRA documents then were sent to the acting general counsel of the CIA, John Rizzo, whose office
forwarded the memos to Bush's Justice Department, according to Senate Armed Services Committee
testimony.
The JPRA memorandums and the Detainee study are dynamite by any standard. To put it all into perspective,
The American Spark below provides the entire Senate floor statement by Armed Services Committee
Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) released on April 21st. Why? Because the matter of U.S. officials approving acts of
torture is a matter affecting everyone.
We also are providing our readers with a link to the entire Senate Armed Services Committee Report on
Detainees.
Today we’re releasing the declassified report of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s investigation into the
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. The report was approved by the Committee on November 20, 2008,
and has, in the intervening period, been under review at the Department of Defense (DoD) for declassification.
In my judgment, the report represents a condemnation of both the Bush administration’s interrogation policies
and of senior administration officials who attempted to shift the blame for abuse – such as that seen at Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan – to low ranking soldiers. Claims, such as that made by former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that detainee abuses could be chalked up to the unauthorized
acts of a “few bad apples,” were simply false.
The truth is that, early on, it was senior civilian leaders who set the tone. On September 16, 2001, Vice
President Dick Cheney suggested that the United States turn to the “dark side” in our response to 9/11. Not
long after that, after White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales called parts of the Geneva Conventions “quaint,”
President Bush determined that provisions of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to certain detainees.
Other senior officials followed the President and Vice President’s lead, authorizing policies that included harsh
and abusive interrogation techniques.
The record established by the Committee’s investigation shows that senior officials sought out information on,
were aware of training in, and authorized the use of abusive interrogation techniques. Those senior officials
bear significant responsibility for creating the legal and operational framework for the abuses. As the
Committee report concluded, authorizations of aggressive interrogation techniques by senior officials resulted
in abuse and conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for
detainees in U.S. military custody.
In a May 10, 2007, letter to his troops, General David Petraeus said that “what sets us apart from our enemies
in this fight… is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate
that we treat non-combatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are warriors, we are also all
human beings.”
With last week’s release of the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions, it is now widely
known that Bush administration officials distorted Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape “SERE” training –
a legitimate program used by the military to train our troops to resist abusive enemy interrogations – by
authorizing abusive techniques from SERE for use in detainee interrogations. Those decisions conveyed the
message that abusive treatment was appropriate for detainees in U.S. custody. They were also an affront to
the values articulated by General Petraeus.
In SERE training, U.S. troops are briefly exposed, in a highly controlled setting, to abusive interrogation
techniques used by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions. The techniques are based on
tactics used by Chinese Communists against American soldiers during the Korean War for the purpose of
eliciting false confessions for propaganda purposes.
Techniques used in SERE training include stripping trainees of their clothing, placing them in stress positions,
putting hoods over their heads, subjecting them to face and body slaps, depriving them of sleep, throwing
them up against a wall, confining them in a small box, treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud music
and flashing lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures. Until recently, the Navy SERE school also
used waterboarding.
The purpose of the SERE program is to provide U.S. troops who might be captured a taste of the treatment
they might face so that they might have a better chance of surviving captivity and resisting abusive and
coercive interrogations.
SERE training techniques were never intended to be used in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody.
The Committee’s report, however, reveals troubling new details of how SERE techniques came to be used in
interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody.
Influence of SERE on Military Interrogations at Guantanamo Bay
The Committee’s investigation uncovered new details about the influence of SERE techniques on military
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). According to newly released testimony from a military
behavioral scientist who worked with interrogators at GTMO:
“By early October [2002] there was increasing pressure to get ‘tougher’ with detainee interrogations” at GTMO.
(p. 50).
As a result, on October 2, 2002, two weeks after attending interrogation training led by SERE instructors from the
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the DoD agency that oversees SERE training, the behavioral scientist
and a colleague drafted a memo proposing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques at GTMO. The
behavioral scientist said he was told by GTMO’s intelligence chief that the interrogation memo needed to contain
coercive techniques or it “wasn’t going to go very far.” (p. 50).
Declassified excerpts from that memo indicate that it included stress positions, food deprivation, forced
grooming, hooding, removal of clothing, exposure to cold weather or water, and scenarios designed to
convince a detainee that “he might experience a painful or fatal outcome.”
On October 11, 2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170 (Joint Task Force 170) at
GTMO requested authority to use aggressive techniques. MG Dunlavey’s request was based on the memo
produced by the behavioral scientists.
MG Dunlavey’s request eventually made its way to Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel Jim
Haynes’ desk. Notwithstanding serious legal concerns raised by the military service lawyers, Haynes
recommended that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approve 15 of the interrogation techniques
requested by GTMO.
On December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Haynes’ recommendation, authorizing such techniques
as stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias (such as fear of dogs), and deprivation of light and
auditory stimuli.
The Committee’s investigation revealed that, following Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization, senior staff at
GTMO drafted a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the use of SERE techniques, including stress
positions, forcibly stripping detainees, slapping, and “walling” them. That SOP stated that:
“The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate
for use in real-world interrogations.”
Weeks later, in January 2003, trainers from the Navy SERE school traveled to GTMO and provided training to
interrogators on the use of SERE techniques on detainees. (pp. 98-104).
Impact of Secretary Rumsfeld’s Authorization on Interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan
The influence of Secretary Rumsfeld’s December 2, 2002, authorization was not limited to interrogations at
GTMO. Newly declassified excerpts from a January 11, 2003, legal review by a Special Mission Unit (SMU)
Task Force lawyer in Afghanistan state that:
“SECDEF’s (SECretary of DEFense Donald Rumsfeld) approval of these techniques provides us the most
persuasive argument for use of ‘advanced techniques’ as we capture possible [high value targets] … the fact
that SECDEF approved the use of the… techniques at GTMO, [which is] subject to the same laws, provides an
analogy and basis for use of these techniques [in accordance with] international and U.S. law.” (p.154).
The Committee’s report also includes a summary of a July 15, 2004, interview with CENTCOM’s (U.S. Central
Command) then-Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) about Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization and its impact
in Afghanistan. The Deputy SJA said:
“The methodologies approved for GTMO… would appear to me to be legal interrogation processes. [The
Secretary of Defense] had approved them. The General Counsel had approved them. .. I believe it is fair to
say the procedures approved for Guantanamo were legal for Afghanistan.” (p. 156).
The Committee’s report provides extensive details about how the aggressive techniques made their way from
Afghanistan to Iraq.
In February 2003, an SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the SMU
interrogation policy from Afghanistan that included aggressive techniques, changed the letterhead, and
adopted the policy verbatim. (p. 158)
Months later, the Interrogation Officer in Charge at Abu Ghraib obtained a copy of the SMU interrogation
policy and submitted it, virtually unchanged, through her chain of command to Combined Joint Task Force 7
(CJTF-7), led at the time by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.
On September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General Sanchez issued an interrogation policy for CJTF-7 that
authorized interrogators to use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military
working dogs to exploit detainees’ fears in their interrogations of detainees.
The Committee’s investigation uncovered documents indicating that, almost immediately after LTG Sanchez
issued his September 14, 2003, policy, CENTCOM lawyers raised concerns about its legality.
One newly declassified email from a CENTCOM lawyer to the Staff Judge Advocate at CJTF-7 – sent just three
days after the policy was issued – warned that:
“Many of the techniques [in the CJTF-7 policy] appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III and IV and should
not be used . . .” (p. 203).
Even though the Bush administration acknowledged that the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, it was not
until nearly a month later that CJTF-7 revised that policy.
Not only did SERE techniques make their way to Iraq, but SERE instructors did as well. In September 2003,
JPRA sent a team to Iraq to provide assistance to interrogation operations at an SMU Task Force. The Chief
of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Task Force testified to the Committee in February 2008
that JPRA personnel demonstrated SERE techniques to SMU personnel including so-called “walling” and
striking a detainee as they do in SERE school. (p. 175).
As we heard at our September 2008 hearing, JPRA personnel were present during abusive interrogations
during that same trip, including one where a detainee was placed on his knees in a stress position and was
repeatedly slapped by an interrogator. (p. 176). JPRA personnel even participated in an interrogation, taking
physical control of a detainee, forcibly stripping him naked, and giving orders for him to be kept in a stress
position for 12 hours.
In August 3, 2007, testimony to the Committee, one of the JPRA team members said that, with respect to
stripping the detainee:
“We [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students.”
The Committee’s investigation revealed that forced nudity continued to be used in interrogations at the SMU
Task Force for months after the JPRA visit. (pp. 181-182).
Over the course of the investigation, the Committee obtained the statements and interviews of scores of
military personnel at Abu Ghraib. These statements reveal that the interrogation techniques authorized by
Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002 for use at GTMO – including stress positions, forced nudity, and military
working dogs – were used by military intelligence personnel responsible for interrogations.
- * The Interrogation Officer in Charge in Abu Ghraib in the fall of 2003 acknowledged that stress positions
were used in interrogations at Abu Ghraib. (p. 212).
- * An Army dog handler at Abu Ghraib told military investigators in February 2004 that “someone from
[military intelligence] gave me a list of cells, for me to go see, and pretty much have my dog bark at them…
Having the dogs bark at detainees was psychologically breaking them down for interrogation purposes.”
(p. 209).
* An intelligence analyst at Abu Ghraib told military investigators in May 2004 that it was “common that
the detainees on [military intelligence] hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as
an incentive to cooperate with us.” (p. 212).
* An interrogator told military investigators in May 2004 that it was “common to see detainees in cells
without clothes or naked” and says it was “one of our approaches.” (p. 213).
The investigation also revealed that interrogation policies authorizing aggressive techniques were approved
months after the CJTF-7 policy was revised to exclude the techniques, and even after the investigation into
detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib had already begun. For example, an interrogation policy approved in February
2004 in Iraq included techniques such as use of military working dogs and stress positions. (p. 220).
A policy approved for CJTF-7 units in Iraq in March 2004 also included aggressive techniques. While much of
the March 2004 policy remains classified, newly declassified excerpts indicate that it warned that interrogators:
“...should consider the fact that some interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise
inconsistent with international law before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a
[CAUTION].”
Among the techniques labeled as such were a technique involving power tools, stress positions, and the
presence of military working dogs. (pp. 220-221).
Warnings about Using SERE Techniques in Interrogations
Some have asked why, if it is okay for our own U.S. personnel to be subjected to physical and psychological
pressures in SERE school, what is wrong with using those SERE training techniques on detainees? The
Committee’s investigation answered that question.
On October 2, 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan Banks, the senior Army SERE psychologist warned against
using SERE training techniques during interrogations in an email to personnel at GTMO, writing that:
"[T]he use of physical pressures brings with it a large number of potential negative side effects… When
individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of discomfort, it is more common for them to resist
harder… If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain, they will eventually do whatever it takes to
stop the pain. This will increase the amount of information they tell the interrogator, but it does not mean the
information is accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of the information because the person will
say whatever he believes will stop the pain…
"Bottom line: the likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the delivery of accurate information
from a detainee is very low. The likelihood that the use of physical pressures will increase the level of
resistance in a detainee is very high…" (p. 53).
Likewise, the Deputy Commander of DoD’s Criminal Investigative Task Force at GTMO told the Committee in
2006 that CITF “was troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations
would be the basis for the utilization of techniques to obtain information.” (p. 69).
Other newly declassified emails reveal additional warnings. In June 2004, after many SERE techniques had
been authorized in interrogations and JPRA was considering sending its SERE trainers to interrogation
facilities in Afghanistan, another SERE psychologist warned:
“[W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE school (done to INCREASE
RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is taught at interrogator school (done to gather information).
What is done by SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct… Simply stated, SERE
school does not train you on how to interrogate, and things you ‘learn’ there by osmosis about interrogation are
probably wrong if copied by interrogators.” (p. 229).
Conclusion
If we are to retain our status as a leader in the world, we must acknowledge and confront the abuse of
detainees in our custody. The Committee’s report and investigation makes significant progress toward that
goal.
There is still the question, however, of whether high level officials who approved and authorized those policies
should be held accountable.
I have recommended to Attorney General Holder that he select a distinguished individual or individuals – either
inside or outside the Justice Department, such as retired federal judges – to look at the volumes of evidence
relating to treatment of detainees, including evidence in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report, and
to recommend what steps, if any, should be taken to establish accountability of high-level officials – including
lawyers.
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