Today's Article
Why our National
Intelligence
Estimates may not
be as reliable as
many think.
Intelligence
Estimates may not
be as reliable as
many think.
The American Spark
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Can We Still Trust National Intelligence Estimates?
By Cliff Montgomery - Jan. 2nd, 2007
How important are National Intelligence Estimates, those "white papers" produced by the intelligence community about a
certain country or region of the world? Can they even be trusted? After all, the infamous 2002 Iraq National Intelligence
Estimate is the report which stated that Iraq still held viable Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and was further still
producing such items--charges which this reporter later proved to be "group think" at best, and outright lying at worst.
Below we quote from a November 2006 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the subject. Since the CRS is
widely known for the impartiality of its reports, its statements demand a hearing.
"National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent
the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national
security importance which may require congressional action.
"The intelligence process and its assessment are, however, not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved
unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE
produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate.
"In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on
key security issues despite--or perhaps because of--the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense
Authorization Act...specifically requests a comprehensive NIE on Iran.
"Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which
they are prepared, or their inherent limitations.
"NIEs represent the highest and most formal level of strategic analysis by the U.S. Intelligence Community. They are by
definition forward-looking...NIEs focus on foreign developments; they are not net assessments that directly compare U.S.
and foreign capabilities and plans.
"The responsibility for producing NIEs rests on the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an entity within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The NIC consists of senior analysts from the Intelligence Community and
substantive experts from the public and private sector. Draft estimates are coordinated by senior officials of all intelligence
agencies in a process that can be quite lengthy.
"In drafting NIEs, analysts marshal evidence from all sources available to the Intelligence Community–human intelligence,
signals intelligence, overhead surveillance, and others including the exploitation of open sources (foreign media and,
increasingly, websites). The lengthy drafting and coordination process includes participation by agency analysts and
occasionally outside experts with varying perspectives.
"At a minimum, NIEs require that differences among analysts be confronted and described. This is an important contribution
as policymakers need to know what is known by the Intelligence Community and what remains unknown and what
conclusions drawn by the government’s most experienced analysts.
"U.S. policymaking, however, occasionally is based on directives by Presidents or senior officials that have not been
coordinated throughout the executive branch or with Congress. Some policy makers assume that their own long experience
and extensive personal contacts gives them better insights than even the most senior intelligence officials. In
considering major new initiatives, there can be an obsessive concern with the potential for leaks that limits discussion to a
very small circle of advisers, and excludes much of the Intelligence Community which is independent of political appointees."
And there may also be a looming problem with the current batch of NIEs, which is revealed in a footnote to the report. It is
an issue often not discussed in the corporate press:
"Though composed of analysts from various government agencies and the public and private sector, the NIC has always
depended heavily on CIA analysts for research and drafting NIEs. The NIC originally reported to the DCI [CIA chief] in his
role as head of the Intelligence Community, but the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004...transferred
the NIC to the newly created Office of the DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. [Hence] many, if not most, current [NIE
analysts] are not CIA career analysts and some observers believe that CIA’s preeminent analytical role has diminished.
Nevertheless, CIA has the broadest analytical coverage of any agency and the largest number of analysts and is likely to
be heavily involved in the preparation of future NIEs."
This footnote produces an obvious question: what do we make of the NIEs, when the best informed analysts are apparently
no longer the ones primarily shaping these estimates which define national policy, and which may even plunge us into
another war?
By Cliff Montgomery - Jan. 2nd, 2007
How important are National Intelligence Estimates, those "white papers" produced by the intelligence community about a
certain country or region of the world? Can they even be trusted? After all, the infamous 2002 Iraq National Intelligence
Estimate is the report which stated that Iraq still held viable Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and was further still
producing such items--charges which this reporter later proved to be "group think" at best, and outright lying at worst.
Below we quote from a November 2006 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the subject. Since the CRS is
widely known for the impartiality of its reports, its statements demand a hearing.
"National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent
the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national
security importance which may require congressional action.
"The intelligence process and its assessment are, however, not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved
unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE
produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate.
"In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on
key security issues despite--or perhaps because of--the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense
Authorization Act...specifically requests a comprehensive NIE on Iran.
"Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which
they are prepared, or their inherent limitations.
"NIEs represent the highest and most formal level of strategic analysis by the U.S. Intelligence Community. They are by
definition forward-looking...NIEs focus on foreign developments; they are not net assessments that directly compare U.S.
and foreign capabilities and plans.
"The responsibility for producing NIEs rests on the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an entity within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The NIC consists of senior analysts from the Intelligence Community and
substantive experts from the public and private sector. Draft estimates are coordinated by senior officials of all intelligence
agencies in a process that can be quite lengthy.
"In drafting NIEs, analysts marshal evidence from all sources available to the Intelligence Community–human intelligence,
signals intelligence, overhead surveillance, and others including the exploitation of open sources (foreign media and,
increasingly, websites). The lengthy drafting and coordination process includes participation by agency analysts and
occasionally outside experts with varying perspectives.
"At a minimum, NIEs require that differences among analysts be confronted and described. This is an important contribution
as policymakers need to know what is known by the Intelligence Community and what remains unknown and what
conclusions drawn by the government’s most experienced analysts.
"U.S. policymaking, however, occasionally is based on directives by Presidents or senior officials that have not been
coordinated throughout the executive branch or with Congress. Some policy makers assume that their own long experience
and extensive personal contacts gives them better insights than even the most senior intelligence officials. In
considering major new initiatives, there can be an obsessive concern with the potential for leaks that limits discussion to a
very small circle of advisers, and excludes much of the Intelligence Community which is independent of political appointees."
And there may also be a looming problem with the current batch of NIEs, which is revealed in a footnote to the report. It is
an issue often not discussed in the corporate press:
"Though composed of analysts from various government agencies and the public and private sector, the NIC has always
depended heavily on CIA analysts for research and drafting NIEs. The NIC originally reported to the DCI [CIA chief] in his
role as head of the Intelligence Community, but the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004...transferred
the NIC to the newly created Office of the DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. [Hence] many, if not most, current [NIE
analysts] are not CIA career analysts and some observers believe that CIA’s preeminent analytical role has diminished.
Nevertheless, CIA has the broadest analytical coverage of any agency and the largest number of analysts and is likely to
be heavily involved in the preparation of future NIEs."
This footnote produces an obvious question: what do we make of the NIEs, when the best informed analysts are apparently
no longer the ones primarily shaping these estimates which define national policy, and which may even plunge us into
another war?