Today's Article
Who will really
benefit from Bush's
new Iraq plan?
benefit from Bush's
new Iraq plan?
The American Spark
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'Advisors' And Contractors Increase Under Bush’s Newest Iraq Plan
By Cliff Montgomery - Jan. 19th, 2007
The White House intends to more than double the number of Iraq's regional reconstruction teams and to add nearly 400
specialists for current and new teams, in fields from politics and law to veterinary care and agribusiness, according to an
official outline of the plan obtained by the New York Times. The plan also seems sure to further enrich large contractors
friendly to the Bush Administration.
As is often the case with this administration, speed is the main thing; thoughtfulness is pushed aside. The document calls
for the increases to be taken swiftly, in three phases, with waves of new teams and personnel to be put in place in March,
June and September. The teams are to further aid rebuilding and governance projects from small offices all over Iraq.
The document describes what an American official familiar with its contents calls simply “the playbook,” and provides
detailed estimates of the costs for these new groups. For example, about $250,000 is set aside for new office furnishings
for a team in the southern city of Basra, which is expected to receive 25 additional specialists.
The plan does call for the creation of about a dozen new reconstruction teams around Iraq, but apparently most new
personnel will be added to existing teams, according to the document obtained by the Times. While 400 new specialists
may not seem like too high a number, we must remember that the current reconstruction teams have, at best, a total of
about 100 civilian specialists--and recruiting that many has been difficult, say officials.
Whether it is wise to create a quick five-fold increase in team staffing is likely to be questioned by existing team members in
Iraq, said the American official who provided the document to the Times.
That is partly because the country's extreme instability has produced highly restrictive security regulations which make it
difficult for the specialists already on the teams to leave their bases and work with Iraqis. The official told the Times that
oversight agencies have also reported suffering shortages in even essential items, such as pencils and other office
supplies. An immediate five-fold increase of officials may only make the current situation much worse.
And there are other criticisms. Many say the teams rely too heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills simply don't match
the specialized needs in the field. That concern is especially pointed at the State Department, which has perhaps
understandably had great difficulty persuading civilian specialists to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and
uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
The document also fails to explain how so many additional government officials with the necessary skills will be recruited,
when the State Department has been able to bring only small numbers to Iraq in the past.
Among those elements already disclosed by United States officials, the Jan. 14th document requests $414 million in
additional State Department financing for 2007, and the likely need to search for the adequate number of technicians to
accept the jobs.
But there are other goodies not previously disclosed. Take this one: a summary at the beginning of the document suggests
that beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to somehow support the counterinsurgency efforts
by the U.S. military. How this would be achieved is not discussed in the document, however.
Cited among the teams' non-military duties is the active promotion of moderate political groups, and to push for
everyone's eventual integration into Iraqi society. In other words, the Iraqi people are to think and act like little Americans...
These plans will almost certainly further benefit one group: contractors friendly to the administration. According to the
document, the Bush Administration plans to spend more than $2 million in office furnishings alone. More than $7 million is
budgeted for information technology, apparently including computers.
"The new plans," the Times states, "could become a windfall for...computer and furniture companies."
If so, it wouldn't be the first time in Iraq that Bush-friendly companies became wealthier at the American soldiers' expense.
Going into Iraq, the Bush Administration made no secret that it would rebuild the country using private contractors, most
of whom were longtime friends or contributors to the Bush team.
What were the results? Released on March 18th, 2004 with little fanfare, a Defense Department (DoD) audit of the deals
that its Defense Contracting Command awarded between February and August 2003 discovered "irregularities in both
the award and administration of the contracts."
The 24 contracts, valued at $122.5 million, were a sock to American taxpayers. The report continued, "DoD cannot be
assured that the best contracting solution was provided, that DoD received fair and reasonable prices for the goods and
services, or that the contractors performed the work the contract required."
By Cliff Montgomery - Jan. 19th, 2007
The White House intends to more than double the number of Iraq's regional reconstruction teams and to add nearly 400
specialists for current and new teams, in fields from politics and law to veterinary care and agribusiness, according to an
official outline of the plan obtained by the New York Times. The plan also seems sure to further enrich large contractors
friendly to the Bush Administration.
As is often the case with this administration, speed is the main thing; thoughtfulness is pushed aside. The document calls
for the increases to be taken swiftly, in three phases, with waves of new teams and personnel to be put in place in March,
June and September. The teams are to further aid rebuilding and governance projects from small offices all over Iraq.
The document describes what an American official familiar with its contents calls simply “the playbook,” and provides
detailed estimates of the costs for these new groups. For example, about $250,000 is set aside for new office furnishings
for a team in the southern city of Basra, which is expected to receive 25 additional specialists.
The plan does call for the creation of about a dozen new reconstruction teams around Iraq, but apparently most new
personnel will be added to existing teams, according to the document obtained by the Times. While 400 new specialists
may not seem like too high a number, we must remember that the current reconstruction teams have, at best, a total of
about 100 civilian specialists--and recruiting that many has been difficult, say officials.
Whether it is wise to create a quick five-fold increase in team staffing is likely to be questioned by existing team members in
Iraq, said the American official who provided the document to the Times.
That is partly because the country's extreme instability has produced highly restrictive security regulations which make it
difficult for the specialists already on the teams to leave their bases and work with Iraqis. The official told the Times that
oversight agencies have also reported suffering shortages in even essential items, such as pencils and other office
supplies. An immediate five-fold increase of officials may only make the current situation much worse.
And there are other criticisms. Many say the teams rely too heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills simply don't match
the specialized needs in the field. That concern is especially pointed at the State Department, which has perhaps
understandably had great difficulty persuading civilian specialists to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and
uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
The document also fails to explain how so many additional government officials with the necessary skills will be recruited,
when the State Department has been able to bring only small numbers to Iraq in the past.
Among those elements already disclosed by United States officials, the Jan. 14th document requests $414 million in
additional State Department financing for 2007, and the likely need to search for the adequate number of technicians to
accept the jobs.
But there are other goodies not previously disclosed. Take this one: a summary at the beginning of the document suggests
that beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to somehow support the counterinsurgency efforts
by the U.S. military. How this would be achieved is not discussed in the document, however.
Cited among the teams' non-military duties is the active promotion of moderate political groups, and to push for
everyone's eventual integration into Iraqi society. In other words, the Iraqi people are to think and act like little Americans...
These plans will almost certainly further benefit one group: contractors friendly to the administration. According to the
document, the Bush Administration plans to spend more than $2 million in office furnishings alone. More than $7 million is
budgeted for information technology, apparently including computers.
"The new plans," the Times states, "could become a windfall for...computer and furniture companies."
If so, it wouldn't be the first time in Iraq that Bush-friendly companies became wealthier at the American soldiers' expense.
Going into Iraq, the Bush Administration made no secret that it would rebuild the country using private contractors, most
of whom were longtime friends or contributors to the Bush team.
What were the results? Released on March 18th, 2004 with little fanfare, a Defense Department (DoD) audit of the deals
that its Defense Contracting Command awarded between February and August 2003 discovered "irregularities in both
the award and administration of the contracts."
The 24 contracts, valued at $122.5 million, were a sock to American taxpayers. The report continued, "DoD cannot be
assured that the best contracting solution was provided, that DoD received fair and reasonable prices for the goods and
services, or that the contractors performed the work the contract required."