Today's Article
Iraq pre-invasion
plan told us it would
be a mess--and that
democracy in Iraq is
impossible.
plan told us it would
be a mess--and that
democracy in Iraq is
impossible.
The American Spark
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1999 Iraq Invasion Study Assumed Growing Chaos
By Cliff Montgomery - Feb. 19th, 2007
"When it looked like we were going in, I called back down to CENTCOM and said, 'You need to dust off Desert Crossing.'
They said, 'What's that? Never heard of it.'"
- General Anthony Zinni (ret.), 2004
In late April 1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.),
conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq
aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The results of the game plans formed the basis of detailed after-action reports
written in June and July 1999.
The After Action Report presented recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq, and was an
interagency production assisted by the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and the CIA,
among others.
The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq--OPLAN
1003-98--tested "worst case" and "most likely" scenarios of a post-Hussein Iraq...and the results weren't good.
Some conclusions are strikingly similar to the events which actually occurred after Hussein was overthrown by U.S. and
coalition forces.
The report recognized that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding for
power" which, in turn, could cause social "fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive
neighbors."
Further, the report revealed worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq
if the post-Hussein government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional
governments.
An exit strategy, the report added, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Hussein Iraq among those
involved in the conflict.
The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing the nature of a new Iraqi government. It noted that
if the U.S. were to establish a transitional government, it may well encounter difficulty from a "period of widespread
bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies."
The Desert Crossing report forcefully stated that any idea of a democratic Iraq "contrasts starkly with the predilections of
some Arab governments."
"Some participants believe," the report went on, "that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence
that would required to install and sustain a democratic government" in Iraq.
While the report stressed that a democratic government in Iraq was not possible, it added that a new pluralistic Iraqi
government which included nationalist leaders might succeed, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force.
The report also suggested that the U.S. role be one of assistance to Middle Eastern governments, which must lead in
creating any stable transitional government for Iraq.
General Zinni, who retired in 2000 shortly after completion of the Desert Crossing study, brought the pre-invasion report to
the attention of the public after the 2003 war. Even before the invasion, the old soldier bravely fought against the
neo-conservative notion that war with Iraq was 'imminent'.
In a major address at the Middle East Institute in October 2002, Zinni scoffed at those who claimed that war was either
inevitable or desirable.
And in a Q&A after the speech, he emphasized that while it was necessary to deal with Saddam Hussein "eventually," "[t]hat
could happen in many ways" short of war.
"The question becomes how to sort out your priorities...my personal view...is that I think this isn't No. 1. It's maybe six or
seven, and the affordability line may be drawn around five."
At a public discussion of Desert Crossing at UCLA in 2004, Zinni discussed the origins of the plan, in the wake of the 1998
Desert Fox bombing campaign:
"It struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam's army, but we didn't have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I asked
the different agencies of government to come together to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq...I thought we ought to
look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and
infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert
Crossing."
Zinni noted the parallels in the Desert Crossing report to the growing chaos and lack of proper planning which unfurled
after the 2003 invasion.
According to Zinni, he eventually decided to create the Desert Crossing invasion plan for Iraq "because I was convinced
nobody in Washington was going to [properly] plan for it, and we, the military, would get stuck with it."
By Cliff Montgomery - Feb. 19th, 2007
"When it looked like we were going in, I called back down to CENTCOM and said, 'You need to dust off Desert Crossing.'
They said, 'What's that? Never heard of it.'"
- General Anthony Zinni (ret.), 2004
In late April 1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.),
conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq
aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The results of the game plans formed the basis of detailed after-action reports
written in June and July 1999.
The After Action Report presented recommendations for further planning regarding regime change in Iraq, and was an
interagency production assisted by the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and the CIA,
among others.
The Desert Crossing war games, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of the main war plan for Iraq--OPLAN
1003-98--tested "worst case" and "most likely" scenarios of a post-Hussein Iraq...and the results weren't good.
Some conclusions are strikingly similar to the events which actually occurred after Hussein was overthrown by U.S. and
coalition forces.
The report recognized that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding for
power" which, in turn, could cause social "fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive
neighbors."
Further, the report revealed worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq
if the post-Hussein government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional
governments.
An exit strategy, the report added, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Hussein Iraq among those
involved in the conflict.
The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing the nature of a new Iraqi government. It noted that
if the U.S. were to establish a transitional government, it may well encounter difficulty from a "period of widespread
bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies."
The Desert Crossing report forcefully stated that any idea of a democratic Iraq "contrasts starkly with the predilections of
some Arab governments."
"Some participants believe," the report went on, "that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence
that would required to install and sustain a democratic government" in Iraq.
While the report stressed that a democratic government in Iraq was not possible, it added that a new pluralistic Iraqi
government which included nationalist leaders might succeed, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force.
The report also suggested that the U.S. role be one of assistance to Middle Eastern governments, which must lead in
creating any stable transitional government for Iraq.
General Zinni, who retired in 2000 shortly after completion of the Desert Crossing study, brought the pre-invasion report to
the attention of the public after the 2003 war. Even before the invasion, the old soldier bravely fought against the
neo-conservative notion that war with Iraq was 'imminent'.
In a major address at the Middle East Institute in October 2002, Zinni scoffed at those who claimed that war was either
inevitable or desirable.
And in a Q&A after the speech, he emphasized that while it was necessary to deal with Saddam Hussein "eventually," "[t]hat
could happen in many ways" short of war.
"The question becomes how to sort out your priorities...my personal view...is that I think this isn't No. 1. It's maybe six or
seven, and the affordability line may be drawn around five."
At a public discussion of Desert Crossing at UCLA in 2004, Zinni discussed the origins of the plan, in the wake of the 1998
Desert Fox bombing campaign:
"It struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam's army, but we didn't have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I asked
the different agencies of government to come together to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq...I thought we ought to
look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and
infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert
Crossing."
Zinni noted the parallels in the Desert Crossing report to the growing chaos and lack of proper planning which unfurled
after the 2003 invasion.
According to Zinni, he eventually decided to create the Desert Crossing invasion plan for Iraq "because I was convinced
nobody in Washington was going to [properly] plan for it, and we, the military, would get stuck with it."