Today's Article
Let's ask a simple
question: Why are
we in Iraq?
question: Why are
we in Iraq?
The American Spark
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Are Islamists Real Winners Of Iraq Occupation?
By Cliff Montgomery
Let's begin by telling a simple truth: The Bush Administration invaded Iraq with little more than fake evidence about scary
weapons and false ideas about "fruitless nation-building," or as the president now puts it, creating "democracy" for others.
But the only people who may actually profit from Bush's misadventure in Iraq are our enemies--groups like al-Qaeda, and
particularly those now in charge of Iraq's huge neighbor to the east, Iran.
The underlying reality here? According to Gareth Porter, an historian and national security policy analyst, the Iraq situation
is now so dire that the U.S. is dependent on both Iran and its Iraqi Shiite political-military allies to continue its occupation.
Few can doubt that three and a half years after the occupation began, the U.S. military is losing power over the "hearts
and minds" of Iraqis with each passing day. As a result, the militants in the area only gain in strength and numbers. The
chief of intelligence for the U.S. Marine Corps stated as much in a recent report, verifying that U.S. troops are now
unable to break the hold that Sunni insurgents have on the vast western province of Anbar.
But according to Porter's article for the Inter Press Service, a liberal wire service, "the main threat to the occupation
comes not from the Sunni insurgents, but from the militant Iraqi Shiite forces aligned with Iran." This is particularly true in
the case of Moqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army.
"The armed Shiite militias are now powerful enough to make it impossible for the U.S. occupation to continue," according to
Porter's IPS article.
U.S. officials have long avoided giving any public estimate of the Mahdi Army's strength. But according to an August report
published by London's Chatham House, which almost certainly reflects the views of British intelligence in Iraq, the Mahdi
Army may now be "several hundred thousand strong."
The Mahdi Army controls Sadr City, the huge Shiite slum in eastern Baghdad holding half the capitol's population. But
perhaps even more important, it controls much of the heavily Shiite southern provinces. Such a swath of power may give
Sadr the ability to bring further U.S. military involvement to a standstill.
A "senior coalition official" admitted to the Washington Post in September that "there's not a military solution" to the Mahdi
Army.
But the administration still appears to believe that there is some way to contain Sadr's power.
"They have not yet accepted that Sadr has both the intention and the capability to bring down the U.S. occupation,"
Porter wrote.
It's clear what Sadr wants. In an interview with the Washington Post published Aug. 11th, Sadr's top deputy, Mustafa
Yaqoubi, said, "If we leave the decision to [the Americans], they will not leave. They'll stay. To get the occupiers to leave,
they need [to make] some sacrifice."
The Shiites have never forgiven the United States for what it perhaps understandably calls a betrayal: During the 1991
Gulf War, the first President Bush called for a popular uprising against Saddam Hussein, and pledged U.S. military
support--only to stand by as Hussein slaughtered thousands of defenseless Shiite Iraqis who took the first Bush at his
word. Most of them therefore never supported the 2003 occupation in the first place.
Wayne White, principal Iraq analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, recalls that a private
poll done by the State Department soon after the start of the U.S. occupation showed a clear majority of Shiites were
already against it.
Problems which the administration itself often fostered--such as the outrages of the Abu Ghraib scandals, as well as the
president's inability to accept that Iraqis may not always see the world as Americans see it--have also made Sadr's
apparent desire for a showdown with U.S. occupation forces enormously popular.
And of course, if anyone will profit from this increasing cycle of groundless hatred and retaliation, it's not the U.S. soldier,
and it's not the Iraqi citizen. It is the radical Islamist, like those currently running Iran, and even those in terror groups like
al-Qaeda.
As Porter puts it, "[The Islamists'] interest lies not in forcing an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, but in keeping them in
Iraq as virtual hostages."
By Cliff Montgomery
Let's begin by telling a simple truth: The Bush Administration invaded Iraq with little more than fake evidence about scary
weapons and false ideas about "fruitless nation-building," or as the president now puts it, creating "democracy" for others.
But the only people who may actually profit from Bush's misadventure in Iraq are our enemies--groups like al-Qaeda, and
particularly those now in charge of Iraq's huge neighbor to the east, Iran.
The underlying reality here? According to Gareth Porter, an historian and national security policy analyst, the Iraq situation
is now so dire that the U.S. is dependent on both Iran and its Iraqi Shiite political-military allies to continue its occupation.
Few can doubt that three and a half years after the occupation began, the U.S. military is losing power over the "hearts
and minds" of Iraqis with each passing day. As a result, the militants in the area only gain in strength and numbers. The
chief of intelligence for the U.S. Marine Corps stated as much in a recent report, verifying that U.S. troops are now
unable to break the hold that Sunni insurgents have on the vast western province of Anbar.
But according to Porter's article for the Inter Press Service, a liberal wire service, "the main threat to the occupation
comes not from the Sunni insurgents, but from the militant Iraqi Shiite forces aligned with Iran." This is particularly true in
the case of Moqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army.
"The armed Shiite militias are now powerful enough to make it impossible for the U.S. occupation to continue," according to
Porter's IPS article.
U.S. officials have long avoided giving any public estimate of the Mahdi Army's strength. But according to an August report
published by London's Chatham House, which almost certainly reflects the views of British intelligence in Iraq, the Mahdi
Army may now be "several hundred thousand strong."
The Mahdi Army controls Sadr City, the huge Shiite slum in eastern Baghdad holding half the capitol's population. But
perhaps even more important, it controls much of the heavily Shiite southern provinces. Such a swath of power may give
Sadr the ability to bring further U.S. military involvement to a standstill.
A "senior coalition official" admitted to the Washington Post in September that "there's not a military solution" to the Mahdi
Army.
But the administration still appears to believe that there is some way to contain Sadr's power.
"They have not yet accepted that Sadr has both the intention and the capability to bring down the U.S. occupation,"
Porter wrote.
It's clear what Sadr wants. In an interview with the Washington Post published Aug. 11th, Sadr's top deputy, Mustafa
Yaqoubi, said, "If we leave the decision to [the Americans], they will not leave. They'll stay. To get the occupiers to leave,
they need [to make] some sacrifice."
The Shiites have never forgiven the United States for what it perhaps understandably calls a betrayal: During the 1991
Gulf War, the first President Bush called for a popular uprising against Saddam Hussein, and pledged U.S. military
support--only to stand by as Hussein slaughtered thousands of defenseless Shiite Iraqis who took the first Bush at his
word. Most of them therefore never supported the 2003 occupation in the first place.
Wayne White, principal Iraq analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, recalls that a private
poll done by the State Department soon after the start of the U.S. occupation showed a clear majority of Shiites were
already against it.
Problems which the administration itself often fostered--such as the outrages of the Abu Ghraib scandals, as well as the
president's inability to accept that Iraqis may not always see the world as Americans see it--have also made Sadr's
apparent desire for a showdown with U.S. occupation forces enormously popular.
And of course, if anyone will profit from this increasing cycle of groundless hatred and retaliation, it's not the U.S. soldier,
and it's not the Iraqi citizen. It is the radical Islamist, like those currently running Iran, and even those in terror groups like
al-Qaeda.
As Porter puts it, "[The Islamists'] interest lies not in forcing an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, but in keeping them in
Iraq as virtual hostages."